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When should firms build talent, and when should they buy? There is theoretical 
consensus that internal hires would exceed externals in performance because of their 
firm-specific human capital. However, by integrating the creativity and innovation 
literature, I present a non-traditional theoretical view which argues that in creative 
environments with a time-lag on related expectations and outputs, externally hired 
managers would exceed internally promoted managers in several different performance-
related outcomes. I also explore the social influence associated with the hiring origin of 
middle managers by integrating psychology and economic rationale to study the impact 
of managerial hiring origin decisions on subordinates. These questions are addressed 
using three years of survey data from a publicly-traded company with employees 
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Hiring decisions are one of the most important and costliest choices that 
organizations regularly make to determine human capital inputs (Bidwell, 2011; Ployhart, 
2004; Ployhart, 2006). For decades, organizational scholars have debated the 
consequences of a fundamental human capital hiring decision well-known as the “make 
vs. buy” decision (Carter & Hodgson, 2006; Mahoney, 2005). To “make” is the decision 
to invest in the development of skills and capabilities of existing employees, giving them 
opportunities to rise across firm ranks by granting them job promotions (internally 
promoted employees). To “buy” is the decision to invest in acquiring external, “ready-to-
go” employees with no prior experience working in the hiring firm (external hires), but 
who can fill organizational needs instantly. Because they possess firm-specific human 
capital, internally promoted employees were found to exceed external hires in 
performance initially, while being paid less (Bidwell, 2011; DeOrtentiis, Van Iddekinge, 
Ployhart, & Heetderks, 2018). However, many firms are currently promoting from within 
and hiring from outside the firm to fill job positions simultaneously (Bidwelll and 
Mollick, 2015; Groysberg, 2010), while also employing external hires into jobs requiring 
firm-specific skills (Keller & Bidwell, 2015). Therefore, it is important to understand the 
conditions under which one origin of hiring is more effective than the other. This paper 
contributes to shifting the scholarly focus from whether or not firms should choose one 
origin of hiring over another, to understanding when firms should make certain decisions 
about the origin of the new hire to gain better outcomes.  
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Much of the empirical research on internal and external hiring simply documents 
their relative prevalence, describes how observable characteristics differ between 
internally promoted employees and external hires, and identifies the types of firms that 
tend to rely on one mode or another. I advance a novel theoretical perspective by 
suggesting that three key issues have yet to be considered when attempting to understand 
the effects of hiring decisions. The first issue concerns how the nature of the outcome 
measured (affective, behavioral, and performance) alters the beneficial influence of the 
origin of hired employees. The second analyzes how the task type can alter the 
relationship between hiring origin and outcomes. The third issue concerns the social 
influence of such hiring decisions, or how the origin of hired employees influences other 
employees in the unit. Chapter 2 focuses on the hired employee’s outcomes,  while 
chapter 2 focuses on the influence of the hiring decision on other employees in the unit.
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CHAPTER 1: CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING VERSUS BUYING MANAGERIAL 
HUMAN CAPITAL IN CREATIVE ENVIRONMENTS 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Despite some progress, the current literature falls short of depicting the practical 
complexity of organizational settings when studying the benefits of externally hired 
versus internally promoted middle managers (Bidwell, 2011; DeOrtentiis et al., 2018; 
Groysberg, 2010). My theory highlights the complex nature of these hiring decisions by 
integrating psychology and economic rationale to propose key contingencies that help 
answer: When should firms hire external middle managers versus promote internal 
middle managers to achieve beneficial outcomes? 
Middle managers are central to influencing organizational outcomes (Ashford, 
1993; Balogun & Johnson, 2004; DeOrtentiis et al., 2018). They serve as a key 
implementer of the firm’s strategy (Wright & Nishi, 2012; Wright & Snell, 1998), a 
direct influencer of subordinate attitudes and behaviors (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 
2002), and a strategic link between otherwise disconnected stakeholders, such as different 
units and different organizational levels (Balogun & Johnson, 2004; Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1997). As a result, the “make vs. buy” decision at the managerial level is a 
critical one. However, research in general has tended to focus more on the executive level 
when studying the consequences of hiring decisions. Therefore, this chapter focuses on 
studying the consequences of the hiring decision of middle managers. 
First, I present a contingent view of managerial hiring decisions, with the goal of 
understanding how internally promoted mangers and externally hired managers differ 
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when looking at various types of outcomes (affective, behavioral, and performance 
outcomes). Most of the past research has focused on subjective performance outcomes of 
the hired individual. However, I investigate different important outcomes, such as 
leadership behavior and engagement, which have been linked to higher order outcomes 
that performance might not explicitly capture.  
Second, I integrate the creativity and innovation literature to study the influence 
of task type in altering the relationship between managerial origin and outcomes. 
Previous research has focused on settings with low knowledge intensive demands and 
more structured features with high turnover, as opposed to knowledge-intensive or 
creative jobs that require a different skillset. Therefore, even though internal hires are 
documented to have superior (initial) productivity than external hires, I argue that firms 
will benefit from hiring external individuals if the function involves creativity.  Creative 
functions require more general criteria when evaluating outcomes and performance.  This 
in turn requires individuals to have generic human capital for success, and firm-specific 
human capital would only be beneficial if the performance criteria are related to the job 
in the specific firm. 
This manuscript contributes to literature in three ways. First, I advance the “make 
vs. buy” scholarly conversation by integrating the creativity and innovation literature to 
better understand when to make versus buy managerial human capital. As firms are both 
hiring from within and outside the firm simultaneously (Bidwell & Keller, 2014; 
Groysberg, 2010), I help shift the scholarly focus from whether or not firms should 
choose one origin of hiring versus another, to a better understanding of when firms 
should use each origin of hiring to gain beneficial outcomes. Second, I use survey data to 
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study the impact of the different hiring sources on a variety of outcomes. I am able to 
capture ratings of performance, leadership behaviors, as well as engagement of the hired 
employees, whereas previous studies have only looked at individual subjective 
performance outcomes (e.g. Bidwell, 2011; DeOrtentiis et al., 2018). Yet an analysis of 
engagement allows us to uncover the causal mechanisms that can influence performance 
by understanding why performance is affected. I further theorize that the outcome of 
interest is an important factor when studying managerial origin, as I investigate 
leadership behaviors and performance to argue that an analysis of performance alone 
might not tell a complete story. Third, the field sample is unique as it allows us to test the 
influence of managerial origin in varying tasks, including tasks that have creativity as a 
performance criterion. While past studies have looked at the financial and service retail 
industries, which are more structured and require less knowledge intensity, I theorize and 
test whether the benefits of the managerial origin are contingent upon the type of task at 
hand. Practically, this study contributes to managerial decisions in that it sheds light on 
how decision-makers can best position the right people in the right places. Specifically, 
understanding how to strategically select managers can have positive outcomes. I address 
these questions by using three years of survey data from a publically traded company. 
1.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.2.1. Hiring Decisions 
As with any capital investment, the management of human capital can often be 
broken down into “make vs. buy” decisions (Miles and Snow, 1984). That is, to fill in 
lateral job vacancies, organizations have a choice of hiring either existing workers for the 
job (internal promotion) or people from the external labor market without past experience 
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working within the hiring firm (external hire). External hiring and internal promotions are 
not always considered simultaneously and occur through different processes. For 
example, a firm may choose to hire a worker from the external market because he/she is 
an attractive candidate that is available for hire at the time (Granovetter, 1974; 
Rosenbaum, 1990). On the other hand, a firm many choose to promote a current worker 
who is believed to have achieved a certain skill level that qualifies him/her to excel in the 
new position.  
Brief History. Cappelli and Keller (2017) presented a historic review of how 
organizations have staffed jobs throughout time. Around the 1950s, models of 
organizational staffing were based on internal labor market theory (Doeringer and Piore, 
1971; 1985), an approach that emphasized developing, promoting, and transferring 
existing employees along and across job ladders within the organization (DiPrete, 1987; 
Stewman & Konda, 1983; Stewman & Yeh, 1991). In other words, organizations planned 
a career for their employees within the firm. If external hiring were considered at all, it 
was implemented for lower-level jobs (Stewman, 1986). A classic example of this 
internal labor market approach is the technology firm Hewlett Packard, within which past 
employees first filled low-level positions and gradually moved up the ladder within the 
firm. However, in the 1980s, firms experienced a dynamic competitive environment 
clouded with the uncertainty of employment demand and supply. In response, there was a 
noted decline in the traditional, internally focused staffing models, as external hires began 
to fill vacant jobs at all levels (Cappelli, 2008). Today, a hybrid model of organizational 
staffing exists, wherein both the external and internal labor markets are in play.  
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Internal Promotions. Internal hiring occurs through job promotions which grant 
existing employees an upward move and higher-paying positions within an organization, 
usually indicated formally by a change in compensation grade level (Bidwell, 2011; 
Campion, Cheraskin, & Stevens, 1994; DiPrete & Soule, 1988; Doeringer & Piore, 1971; 
Gerhart, 2017; Markham, Harlan, & Hackett, 1987). While the definition of job 
promotion varies slightly in literature, the agreed-upon conditions that comprise a job 
promotion are an offer of a higher-level position in the organizational hierarchy and a 
promise of higher pay. These conditions are also agreed-upon practically, as a World at 
Work survey of 541 member companies reported that higher-level responsibilities/jobs 
(80%) and an increase in pay grade, band, or level (80%) are the top two criteria when 
defining employee promotion (WorldatWork, 2016). Individual performance, as reflected 
in performance ratings, are the primary determinant of job promotions in most 
organizations (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1989; Rosenbaum, 1984). For example, Gerhart and 
Milkovich (1989); Rosenbaum, 1984). For example, Gerhart and Milkovich (1989) 
reported that employees scoring one point above the mean on a four-point performance 
scale received 48% more promotions over a six-year period when compared with those 
who scored at the performance mean. Although some firms grant job promotions when 
they need to fill a position vacancy (Stewman and Konda, 1983; White, 1970), others 
grant promotions when individuals are judged to have the skills needed for the higher 
rank, regardless of a position vacancy (Barnett and Miner, 1992; Stewman and Yeh, 
1991). 
Slichter (1919) first recommended that job vacancies be filled through internal 
promotion because such promotions motivate workers with the hope of promotion, 
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reduce the likelihood of turnover, and help recruit better-fitting employees. In time, 
internal promotions have been further identified as a high-performance work practice that 
has been shown to relate to firm level outcomes (Delery & Shaw, 2001; Huselid, 1995). 
In a meta-analysis about HPWPs, Combs, Liu, Hall, and Ketchen (2006) analyzed 12 
studies that used internal promotions and found a .15 correlation with performance 
measures. Posthuma et al.’s 2013 comprehensive review of high-performance work 
practices (HPWP) recorded 107 studies under the subheading “promotions,” and of those, 
the majority were concerned with promotions from within. 
There are also costs to hiring internal candidates, which costs have been 
highlighted in literature. First, because organizations have a continuing relationship with 
passed-over employees, or qualified employees who were not selected for the job 
promotion, the numbers of which usually surpass the number of promoted employees, 
inequity perception will likely trigger negative feelings and behaviors. Literature has 
shown that passed-over employees often become dissatisfied and turn away from the 
organization (Spector & Fox, 2010), become envious (Schaubroeck and Lam, 2004), and 
exemplify counterproductive work behaviors (Lam and Schaubroeck, 2000). Such 
deviant behaviors can, in turn, affect the hired person’s performance and neutralize the 
motivational effect intended by the firm. There is also evidence that the number of 
complaints and grievances related to promotions becomes significantly higher after a 
promotion event (Allen, 1997). This is not a concern with external selection, as the 
organization does not have a continuing relationship with external candidates who were 
not selected for the job. 
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Distinguishing Between Job Promotions and Other HR Practices. Job promotions 
are distinct from other rewards and HR practices that, on the surface, might be seen as 
having similar effects, such as job rotations and pay-for-performance schemes.  I argue 
that job promotions are different than other types of rewards and HR practices in three 
ways. First, job promotions are arguably the most salient type of reward in an 
organization. As opposed to a monetary bonus or merit reward, for example, which are 
more salient to the individual receiving it than the workgroup, job promotions involve a 
movement within the organization (or internal movement) accompanying job position 
upgrade and/or a title change that makes it apparent to the workgroup that the individual 
was rewarded. Therefore, it can be argued that it is more impactful on coworkers than 
other reward practices. Second, job promotions offer intrinsic as well as extrinsic rewards 
simultaneously, as they increase status, esteem, responsibilities and financial rewards 
(Forbes, 1987; Gutteridge, 1973; Rosenbaum, 1984; Tharenou, 1997). Job rotation, which 
might be seen as similar to job promotions, refers to any change in assignment, usually 
indicated by a change in title or department, but, unlike job promotions, does not involve 
a change in compensation level (Campion et al., 2014). Third, average pay increase due 
to a job promotion (over 8%; World at Work, 2010) is larger than the typical within-
grade merit increase (about 3%; Gerhart & Fang, 2014), giving a greater motivational 
boost to employees. Finally, organizational rewards, such as pay-for-performance 
schemes, are expected if an employee meets his/her goals or certain criteria, and eligible 
to almost all employees.  However, job promotions are usually unexpected events 
(Holtom et al., 2005; Mitchell, Holtom, Lee, & Graske, 2001) that might not be 
experienced by all employees. Therefore, these factors make job promotions a core 
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influential motivational tool for organizations and understanding how they translate to 
performance is crucial for firm success.  
External Hiring. External hires are individuals who are hired with a specific firm 
but have had no experience working in that firm. This process begins with external 
recruitment, where organizations source candidates outside of the organization (see Yu & 
Cable, 2012). Barber (1998) divided the recruitment process into three stages— 
generating applicants, maintaining applicant status, and influencing job choices. Ployhart 
and Kim (2012) presented a model of strategic recruitment where job boards, social 
media, websites, and referrals are among the most common external sources of 
recruitment. 
External hires may be selected over internal candidates for many reasons, 
including to fill specific organizational needs. For example, the most-discussed advantage 
for firms to hire external candidates over internal candidates is to learn from and take 
advantage of outside experience acquired from former organizations (Rao & Drazin, 
2002; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), and sometimes even to profit from the employees’ 
relationships with former employers and clients (Somaya, Williamson, & Lorinkova, 
2008). Some argue that external candidates bring in new and variant perspectives, skills 
sets, and ideas into the organization (Bidwell & Keller, 2014; Brookmire, 2013; 
Carpenter & Wade, 2002; Reilly et al., 2014), which may be much-needed during 
organizational transitions or change efforts. Environmental forces like fast changes in 
business conditions, greater complexity in business, rapid internationalization, changes in 
technology, new competition, and innovation impact the demand for human capital 
requiring different employee skills (rapid learning, computer skills, creativity, etc…). 
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These changes may create a skill profile mismatch with the market demands, making 
external employees who already possess such skills more appealing to firms. External 
hires were also found to be more impactful when presenting ideas (Reilly et al., 2014). 
Additionally, there may not be a ready-to-go internal candidate to fill the position 
immediately. Because internal candidates are typically promoted to a higher position 
(DeVaro, Antti Kauhanen, & Valmari, 2019), they are then required to acquire and 
develop different skillsets before taking over new responsibilities, a process which takes 
time and resources. On the other hand, most external candidates are hired into similar 
positions (DeVaro, et al., 2019), making them more prepared to fill the new position. 
Hiring from the outside may also send a signal to the external labor market by creating a 
positive labor market reputation, making future hiring easier and thus more likely (Reilly 
et al., 2014). Additionally, Huselid and Becker (1995) termed job promotion practices as 
"bureaucratic HR" and found them to have economically and statistically significant 
negative effects on firm profitability in two different data sets.  
The “Make vs. Buy” Argument. Whether organizations should choose one origin 
of hiring over the other has become a long-argued conceptual debate within 
organizational literature (Carter & Hodgson, 2006; Coase, 1937; Culliton, 1942; 
Mahoney, 2005; Walker & Weber, 1984). However, much of the current empirical 
research on internal and external hiring simply documents their prevalence in 
organizations, describes how observable characteristics differ between internal and 
external hires, and identifies the types of firms that choose one origin of hiring method 
versus another (Bidwell & Keller, 2014; Baker et al., 1994; Devaro et al., 2015; Keller & 
Bidwell, 2015). This leads to lack of clarity regarding which mode of hiring may be more 
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beneficial than the other. In this dissertation, I extend this line of research by theorizing 
and empirically testing how and when each mode of hiring influences the performance, 
behavior, and attitudes of the hired individual (Chapter 1), as well as his/her subordinates 
(Chapter 2).  
1.2.2. Organizational Engagement 
While the definition of organizational engagement varies slightly in literature, the 
main concept is that it is a positive, work-related state of mind held by the employee 
towards the organization (Kahn, 1990; Robinson, Perryman, & Hayday, 2004), a state of 
mind characterized by vigor, dedication, and absorption (Schaufeli, Salanova, & 
Gonzalez-Roma, 2002). The definition of engagement involves experiencing energy, 
putting in effort, staying involved, showing up for work, remaining focused on the task 
(Kahn, 2010; Schenider et al., 2017), or being psychologically engaged (Macey and 
Schneider (2008) referred to it as state engagement).  
Studies indicate that engaged employees are more committed, motivated, and 
empowered to perform in-role and extra-role behaviors, as well as less likely to 
voluntarily turnover (Christian, Garza, & Slaughter, 2011; Rich, LePine, & Crawford, 
2010; Schaufeli, 2012). Studying employee engagement is important because it has been 
linked to individual, unit, and firm performance (e.g. Bates, 2004; Baumruk, 2004; 
Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002; Rich, LePine, & Crawford, 2010; Richman, 2006; Saks, 
2006; Saks & Gruman, 2014) and has been described as the key to an organization’s 
success and competitiveness (Macey, Schneider, Barbera, & Young, 2009; Saks & 
Gruman, 2014). Shuck, Adelson, & Reio (2017) provide a comprehensive review of how 
employee engagement is different from other constructs, such as job satisfaction. Harter 
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and colleagues (2005) provide meta-analytic evidence to test the more appropriate causal 
direction between employee engagement and performance outcomes. They found that 
there was a stronger relationship from employee engagement to performance outcomes 
than from performance outcomes to employee engagement. This means that employee 
engagement is an important mechanism—that managers should focus attention on how to 
enhance employee engagement in order to reach desired business outcomes.  
Although employee engagement has been linked to important individual and 
organizational outcomes, less theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to 
examining how HR practices and decisions contribute to employee engagement (Saks, 
2006; Zhong, Wayne, & Liden, 2015). Employee engagement is important because it 
plays a key role in the translation of HR practices, such as job promotions, into actual 
outcomes, such as performance or behavior. In this dissertation, I contribute to this 
literature by examining the engagement of the internally/externally hired manager 
(Chapter 1) as well as the engagement of his/her subordinates (Chapter 2) in order to 
understand the mechanisms of how hiring decisions influence important outcomes.  
1.3. HYPOTHESES 
1.3.1. Hiring Origin & Manager Performance 
The majority of the conceptual work in the organizational management field 
supports the idea that internally promoted managers may be more productive than 
external hires because they possess firm-specific human capital derived from their 
experience within the firm (Becker, 1962; Kor and Mahoney, 2004; Penrose, 1959). 
Firm-specific human capital is the knowledge and skills acquired through working at a 
specific organization and cannot be easily applied to other firms (Becker, 1964; 
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Buchholtz, Ribbens, & Houle, 2003; Chadwick & Dabu, 2009; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Kor 
& Leblebici, 2005). This includes having (1) knowledge of organizational procedures, 
processes, resources, capabilities, and routines, (2) shared knowledge of various aspects 
of the firm (e.g. culture, social system, interpersonal relationships) and (3) tacit 
knowledge about the role of different stakeholders and their needs (Becker & Gerhart, 
1996; Schein, 1990; Schmitt & Chan, 1998). All these factors can significantly affect a 
worker’s performance and help get the new hire “up to speed” in their new role more 
quickly than external hires (Krell, 2015; Reilly et al., 2014).  
Surprisingly, the empirical stream of research in this area is very scarce in the 
organizational management field. Bidwell (2011) compared external and internal hires 
employed into similar positions within the same financial firm using their subjective 
performance evaluations (measured using three factors: meeting objectives, having skills 
that match job requirements, and a forced performance rank). He found that internal hires 
outperformed external hires even though external hires had stronger general ability. This 
effect lasted over time; it took external hires two years to catch up with the performance 
levels of internal hires. DeOrtentiis and colleagues (2018) used data from a service retail 
organization to test whether internally promoted managers would receive higher 
performance ratings than externally hired managers. Manager performance was 
composed of several factors, measured annually, and evaluated using a 5-point scale, 
wherein supervisors assessed managers according to their judgment, communication 
skills, problem-solving skills, and effectiveness in subordinate management. They found 
a small effect size that supported their hypotheses that internally promoted managers 
would receive higher performance ratings than externally hired managers (although they 
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concluded that the support was not especially strong because the hiring mode explained 
only 1% of the variance in manager performance ratings, and the mean difference 
between internal and external hire performance was small).  
I contend that internally promoted managers will have better job performance 
ratings than external hires due to four advantages that firm-specific human capital brings: 
lower adjustment costs, knowledge about different stakeholders, a better understanding of 
firm-specific criteria, and a signal about future performance.  First, internally promoted 
managers will require fewer adjustment costs when compared with external hires in terms 
of knowledge about a firm’s business practices, values, and customers. Internal hires will 
require less time and effort to adjust in their new position because they already have an 
understanding of firm-specific knowledge with regard to organizational procedures, 
processes, resources, and routines. External hires lack firm-specific human capital 
because they do not have previous experience working in the organization for which they 
were hired. In fact, external hires may even need to unlearn knowledge gained in their 
previous firms before they can internalize the firm-specific knowledge of a new firm 
(Kor & Libibchi, 2005).  Until they develop sufficient firm-specific knowledge, external 
hires may not be as productive as internal hires (Gilson and Mnookin, 1985). Second, 
internally promoted managers will have tacit knowledge about the needs and expectations 
of different stakeholders, such as employees, customers, and top management (Becker & 
Gerhart, 1996). For example, if the manager understands the skills and habits of his/her 
subordinates from day one, he/she would be able to manage and work with them more 
effectively and efficiently, which would reflect positively on the manager’s individual 
performance. In contrast, external hires need more time to understand his/her 
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subordinates’ skills, abilities, expectations, and habits. Third, internally promoted 
managers would better understand implicit job performance priorities, requirements, and 
firm-specific criteria (DeOrtentiis et al., 2018). For example, while “communication” 
may be a common performance criteria for which managers are evaluated, different firms 
expect different behaviors when it comes to communication, as one firm might evaluate 
managers on his/her communication with top management, while another firm may 
expect and evaluate a manager by his/her communication with his/her subordinates, and a 
third firm might have “communication” on the evaluation sheet, but it is not a priority 
when compared to other performance criteria. Externally hired managers would be 
initially ignorant of the types of behaviors and priorities that they should focus on. 
Fourth, the benefit of hiring managers internally includes greater stability and 
predictability of his/her skills and capabilities (Pfeffer & Baron, 1988). Getting a job 
promotion provides a signal to the manager’s supervisor about the performance and 
ability of the newly hired manager. Management typically have more information about 
internal candidates’ past performance and behavior within the organization, making it 
easier to assess fit and ability to succeed in the new job position. In this regard, hiring 
external candidates may be riskier than hiring internal candidates because organizations 
have less objective information about external candidates, leading to difficulties with 
forecasting training and developmental needs. This concept is backed by the fact that 
external hires have more variable performance than internal hires, and thus, lower rates of 
success. Practical journals have also reported the costly expenses and variable 
performance of hiring external employees, wherein between 40 to 60 percent of external 
hires aren't successful, compared with only 25% of internal hires (Schawbel, 2012). Such 
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findings trigger questions from the manager’s supervisor about the external manager’s 
abilities and job performance. External managers may also be held to a higher standard, 
given the fact that they have more occupational capital than do internal managers, who 
are typically on-boarded with job trainings and monitoring (Keller, 2018).  
Hypothesis 1: Externally hired managers will initially perform lower than 
internally promoted managers. 
1.3.2. Hiring Origin & Manager Leadership Behaviors  
While internal hires have firm-specific human capital as a tool to exceed in initial 
performance over external hires (Hypothesis 1), external hires also possess a capability 
that helps them excel even over internal hires in certain instances. I argue that external 
hires would have greater task-specific human capital, specifically leadership skills, which 
helps them excel in outcomes other than performance. Therefore, because it is important 
to look at outcomes other than performance in order to understand the full picture, I 
theorize a link between hiring origin and leadership behaviors that would tell a different 
story than by simply looking at subjective performance measures.  
Lateral versus Horizontal Moves. Job promotions entail an increase in 
responsibility for the promoted individuals (internal hires). World at Work surveyed 541 
member companies and reported that 80% of the firms include higher-level job 
responsibility as top criteria for defining employee promotion (World at Work, 2016). 
Outside of the technical, job-related responsibilities that increase/change by moving from 
one level to another, the individual promoted to various managerial levels would also 
have the responsibility of managing subordinates. Therefore, the new position to which 
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the middle manager is promoted would require multiple skillsets, including leadership 
skills.  
Unlike internally promoted individuals, however, external hires are less likely to 
experience more or different kinds of responsibilities from their previous positions, as 
they are most likely to be hired to a position at a similar level/job title in the hiring firm 
as in their previous firm (Bidwell and Mollick, 2015; DeVaro, Kauhanen, & Valmari, 
2019). The assumption that guides the logic of this hypothesis is supported by multiple 
studies in varying contexts. For example, DeVaro, Kauhanen, & Valmari (2019) 
documented the relevant frequency of 7 modes of job entry in an employee–employer 
panel of multiple Finnish organizations from 1981 to 2014. They found that the most 
common type of job entry route is through an external horizontal transfer (33%). Other 
modes of external hire job entry were less frequently observed, especially with regard to 
the frequency of external hires promoted to a higher level/job title, which was labeled as 
a rare occurrence. Bidwell and Mollick (2015) also documented the frequency of external 
hires being appointed to the same job position in the new hiring firm (83%), as opposed 
to being promoted to a higher position (4%). These results support the assumption that 
external horizontal moves are the most common way to hire externally, meaning that 
external hires typically originate from the same job in a previous firm. 
One interpretation of these results is that firms “play it safe” by hiring outsiders 
only to jobs that they held previously. Therefore, because external hires typically 
originate from the same job position/level they had in a previous firm, external hires 
would have higher occupation-specific or task-specific capital when compared with 
internally promoted hires (Kambourov and Manovskii 2009; Gathmann and Schönberg 
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2010), which is portable across firms (Gibbons and Waldman 2004, 2006; Kambourov 
and Manovskii 2009; Gathmann and Schönberg 2010; Cassidy 2017). Specifically, 
externals would possess advanced leadership skills developed from their managerial role 
in their previous firm, an important dimension of their job responsibility as managers. 
Because of such previous experience managing subordinates in a similar position, 
external hires would possess more generic human capital that the internal hire. 
Specifically, they would exhibit higher leadership behavior quality because leadership is 
a generic skill that can be applied across multiple firms. Internal hires on the other hand 
would need more time to develop leadership skills over time. 
In this vein, one might argue that higher-level managers (e.g. floor managers 
versus directors) have already experienced and developed leadership skills in previous 
management positions within the firm. However, I argue that the necessary leadership 
skills at differing levels of the organization vary in scope and requirements (e.g. skills for 
leading floor employees differ from skills for leading regional directors); therefore, a firm 
would still benefit from the leadership skills of external hires. Thus, I hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypothesis 2: Externally hired managers will initially exhibit higher quality of 
leadership behaviors than internally promoted managers. 
1.3.3. Hiring Origin & Manager Engagement  
There is an implicit assumption in literature that job promotions increase the 
promoted individuals’ engagement, even though the direct relationship has not been, to 
my knowledge, empirically tested. The closest and most cited relationship used to support 
this premise comes from a meta-analysis on organizational commitment. The findings 
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indicated that satisfaction with promotion opportunities increased organizational 
commitment (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). The construct job satisfaction is also measured, 
with promotion opportunities as one of the facets. However, Carson, Carson, Griffeth, 
and Steel’s (1994) study distinguished between perceptions of promotional opportunity, 
actual promotion, and promotion satisfaction. Using meta-analytical procedures, they 
found that each of the three constructs did not have similar consequences (turnover was 
the variable of interest). Therefore, it is important to empirically test the direct 
relationship of experiencing an actual job promotion and engagement.   
Much about pre-job promotion motivation can be explained by tournament theory 
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981). During the tournament, the promotion is the motivating 
reward. However, according to tournament theory logic, after a promotion is achieved, 
the motivation of the promoted individuals becomes insufficient. However, psychological 
theories such as expectancy theory (Vroom, 1963) and equity theory (Adams, 1965) both 
suggest that the relationship between rewards and performance should play a key role in 
motivating employee behavior. In this context, important rewards include job 
promotions. Hiring internal workers through job promotions increases their status, 
esteem, responsibilities, and financial rewards (Forbes, 1987; Rosenbaum, 1984; 
Tharenou, 1997). Job promotions have also been found to decrease desirability of 
turnover by increasing organizational attachment (Lee, Mitchell, Sablynski, Burton, & 
Holtom, 2004), as they increase prospects of future job opportunities and are associated 
with pay growth (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992). I use signaling theory below to explain 
how job promotions may lead to organizational engagement.  
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Signaling Theory. Organizations are dynamic, and as a consequence, current 
employees do not have perfect information about the organization. Since employees have 
incomplete information about the organization’s intentions, they use signals from the 
organization to draw conclusions about an organization's intentions and actions (Spense, 
1973), including looking at implemented HR practices. HR practices may serve as signals 
to workers, allowing them to better understand desired behaviors and appropriate 
responses, and to share common beliefs about which behaviors are expected and 
rewarded (Guzzo & Noonan, 1994; Rousseau, 1995; Tsui, Pierce, & Porter, 1997). They 
may also be perceived as symbolic of broader organizational characteristics and values 
(Rynes, Bretz, & Gerhart, 1991). For example, Rynes et al. (1991) concluded that job 
applicants use cues or signals from an organization to draw conclusions about the 
organization's intentions, actions, and characteristics because they do not have perfect 
information about the organization. These signals provide information about both the 
working conditions and values of the organization (Breaugh, 1992; Turban, 2001; Turban 
& Greening, 1997). Signals might include looking at the recruiters’ demographic 
background as a signal for the organization’s diversity values, or analyzing the 
compensation system in order to assess the importance of collaboration in the job 
position. Within job promotion literature, signaling theory has been used to propose that 
promotions serve as a signal to the external labor market of an employee’s ability (e.g. 
DeVaro & Waldman, 2007; DeVaro & Waldman, 2012; Trevor et al., 1997; Waldman, 
1984; Waldman, 2013). Specifically, it focuses on the promoted individual as observed 
by other potential employers, as these firms may later infer that a worker is of high ability 
 
22 
based on his/her job promotion (DeVaro & Waldman, 2007), thus making them more 
likely to leave the current organization once promoted (Trevor et al., 1997).  
The selection practice which involves deciding the manager’s origin also sends 
signals about the firm to the internal labor market. In the case of hiring an internal 
manager through a job promotion, I argue that such a move sends signals to the promoted 
individual about career progress, growth opportunities, and how much the firm values 
that individual. Signals about career progress and growth opportunities could be 
interpreted by the promoted individual as a signal of the management’s willingness to 
invest in that specific employee and his/her career development, as well as the firm’s 
long-term interest in the employee. This signal specifically fulfills the need for growth 
and attainment of potential (Alderfer, 1969) that is inherent in individuals and recognized 
by the majority of the motivational theories (Alderfer, 1969; Herzberg, 1966; Maslow, 
1968; McClelland, 1962). Recent research has shown that career growth is an important 
determinant of employee–organizational relationships (Weng & McElroy, 2012). Seigts 
and colleagues (2006) identified career advancement as an important engagement factor. 
Organizations that provide mechanisms for employee career advancement create a mutual 
investment type of relationship with their employees that, in turn, is reflected by a 
relationship that ties career growth to important outcomes, such as perceived 
organizational support (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997). For example, Liu (2004) 
found that employee perceptions of career development opportunities were positively 
related to perceived organizational support, which, in turn, was related to employee 
engagement (Zhong et al., 2016). Additionally, job promotions signal job security and a 
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long-term interest in employees, which meets one of three psychological safety condition 
identified by Kahn (1990) as drivers of engagement.  
External hires, on the other hand, would be less engaged, because in addition to 
learning the job’s responsibilities and requirements, external hires also have to undergo a 
learning cycle about firm-specific routines, rules, policies, and systems. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that externally hired managers will have less organizational engagement than 
internally promoted managers. 
Hypothesis 3: Externally hired managers will initially be less organizationally 
engaged than internally promoted managers. 
1.3.4. Moderator: Hiring mode, Manager Performance, and Creative Functions 
Conventional wisdom holds that firms are better off hiring internal employees to 
open job positions because these individuals constitute firm-specific knowledge and 
skills. While the majority of conceptual theories and practical press concentrate on the 
benefits on staffing internal hires more than external hires, there lies varying empirical 
evidence of the effects of internal versus external hires on several different outcomes and 
in several different contexts. For example, while some studies found evidence that 
internal hires exceeded external hires in terms of performance measures, at least in the 
short run (DeOrtentiis et al., 2018; Bidwell, 2011), other studies have failed to find this 
relationship (e.g. Kor & Leblebici, 2005; Reilly et al., 2014). For example, using a 
sample of law firms, Kor and Leblebici (2005) studied the complementary relationships 
between the firm’s strategies (geographical and service diversification), the origin of 
hiring of associates (external versus internal employees), and human capital development 
strategies (the ratio of associates working with knowledge experts) on the firm’s 
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profitability.  Even though the comparison between internal and external associates was 
only used as a moderator and not directly tested, the regression table shows no significant 
relationship between the degree to which a firm hired associates externally instead of 
developing them internally and firm profits. This means that the study did not find 
evidence that hiring internal associates is more beneficial than hiring external associates 
when it comes to unit performance. The study did find however an interaction effect, 
where the relationship between the hiring origin of associates and firm performance 
relied on the firm’s human capital development strategies.  
A study by Reilly and colleagues (2014) also used the firm-specific human capital 
advantage logic when predicting the difference between the immediate effect of hiring 
rates (external hires) and transfer-in rates (internal hires) on patient satisfaction (their 
Hypothesis 3c). The study did not find support for the relationship; there was no evidence 
to prove that there is a difference between external and internal hiring rates on immediate 
patient satisfaction. However, the study also hypothesized and found that the positive 
effect of hiring rates on patient satisfaction lasted longer than the positive effect of 
transfer-in rates on patient satisfaction which didn’t exceed five months. This was 
attributed to the idea that external hires have a more innovative perspective than internal 
hires. Another study looking at 185 women’s Division I basketball coaches over time 
found that the origin of the new coach (whether insider or outsider) did not matter, as 
they all had approximately the same subsequent performance results when measured by 
team wins (Pierce, Johnson, Krohn, & Judge, 2017). Overall, these results (or lack of) 
suggest that the effect of hiring internal versus external candidates can be more 
contextually related. Below, I argue that in creative job function, externally hired 
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managers will perform better than internally promoted managers because of the 
importance of occupationally specific skills, and role transition.  
Although a wave of studies supports the notion that integrating outsiders who lack 
firm-specific human capital results in high costs, I believe that context plays a vital role 
in determining how important firm-specific human capital really is to performance. Firm-
specific human capital was found to be important to performance when job environments 
allowed for the ‘human element’ to be controlled.  For example, the sample used in 
previous studies included jobs with more routinized tasks and relatively lower 
knowledge-based skills needed and higher turnover observed, such as banking (e.g. 
Bidwell, 2011) and quick-service (e.g. DeOrtentiis et al., 2018) jobs. In such contexts, 
performance is required from day one, and speed is a skill and criterion on which 
employees would be evaluated. This means that knowing the norms, routines, policies, 
and procedures beforehand would bring an advantage to employees, while thos lacking 
such knowledge (external candidates) would need more time to learn. However, I argue 
that there are distinct organizational contexts wherein firm-specific human capital would 
not only be irrelevant, but it could even cause harm. For example, for jobs that demand 
and have a facet of innovation or creativity as a performance criterion, outside knowledge 
that is not firm-specific would be important for performance and success. In fact, firm-
specific knowledge might limit the performance an individual working in a creative 
function as firm-specific knowledge might instigate group-think, lower diversity, limited 
communication and bias.  
Creative Function. A creative environment is not defined with respect to a 
particular occupation (Mumford, Whetzel, & Reiter-Palmon, 1997). A creative 
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environment can occur when the tasks presented involve complex and complicated 
problems where performance requires a generation of novel, useful solutions (Besemer & 
O'Quin, 1999, Ford, 2000, Mumford & Gustafson, 1988, Ward et al., 1999). 
Researchers have reported very little difference between innovative and creative 
tasks (Amabile, 1996; Mumford, et al.,1997). Creativity usually involves a step where 
new knowledge or ideas are processed, whereas innovation addresses the use or 
commercialization of inventions. Additionally, environments that stimulate creativity are 
likely to motivate innovation (see, for example, Amabile, 1996). Creativity based on 
imagination and originality can thus be considered as overlapping strongly with 
innovation tasks. 
There are important distinctions to consider when understanding the unique 
aspects of functions requiring creativity and innovation. For example, the outputs and 
performance measures are usually different than those used in other departments of a 
firm. Rather than the timely and market-sensitive measures to which employees are  
accustomed, such as profitability and return on investment, creative functions tend to 
have a time-lagged, nonmarket aspects to the related outputs (Narayanan, 2001). For 
example, new products, patents, medication, or innovations can take years before they are 
transformed into actual outputs whereby financial value can be captured. Hence, 
performance measurement and evaluation of creative functions is usually performed 
under uncertainty, with the use of proxies such as management evaluation of project 
progress. Therefore, for such occupations, demand for firm-specific skills may not be as 
salient as non-knowledge intensive jobs that require people to perform on day one (e.g. 
service industry or banking industry). 
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Additionally, some aspects of firm-specific human capital might not be beneficial 
in creative and innovative contexts. One concern with hiring internal candidates is that it 
would limit organizational diversity and innovation (Schawbel, 2012). Bringing 
experience from outside the company can be advantageous, especially when the ideas 
generated by outside newcomers are likely to be less incremental than ideas from inside 
workers. The executive literature has highlighted such findings in numerous studies. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), suggest that interfirm movement of personnel is a 
particularly important mechanism through which innovations diffuse among competitors 
in an industry. Similarly, the resource-based view of the firm acknowledges that 
recruitment from outside can enable firms to bypass constraints on growth imposed when 
relying solely on internally grown resources and capabilities (Barney 1991; Penrose 
1959). Additionally, external hires would not have psychological ties (perceived and real) 
within the hiring organization that might complicate efforts both to exceed in 
performance and take on leadership initiatives (Dai, De Meuse, and Garddert, 2011). 
Social ties and established social capital with members in the organization might heighten 
political biases and limit openness and the sharing of new ideas, which is a vital feature 
in a creative context.  
Leading creative and innovative employees requires managers to possess certain 
skills in addition to technical expertise (Amabile, 1988; Amabile, Schatzel, Moneta, & 
Kramer, 2004; Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange, 2002). Leaders in such occupational 
creative departments are usually selected as much for their technical expertise as for their 
leadership skills (Narayanan, 2001). Because employers will focus on hiring people from 
the outside who have already held a similar level of responsibility (Bidwelll and Mollick, 
 
28 
2015), external hires will not only introduce a fresh perspective, but would have more 
task and occupational human capital than internal hires, including the skills to lead a team 
of creative individuals. For internal hires, however, the transitional switch from 
subordinate to manager would be more salient. As Ashforth, Kreiner, & Fugate (2006) 
emphasized, the transitional roles from subordinates to middle managers in the workplace 
(vertical code-switching) create role conflict. The norms and expectations associated with 
being a leader are incompatible with the norms and expectations associated with those of 
a subordinate or coworker. Therefore, the internally promoted managers must disengage 
from a task that requires one mindset and engage in another task that requires a very 
different mindset. Getting physically and psychologically accommodated to the new role 
not only disrupts physical performance, but also creates psychological strain and stress 
(Ashforth et al., 2006).  
Although many variables influence creativity and innovation, a literature review 
by Mumford and colleagues (2002) which examined how leadership behaviors contribute 
to creativity and innovation in organizational settings found that leadership of creative 
people requires most importantly expertise. Therefore, while internally promoted 
managers may have an advantage over externals by possessing firm-specific human 
capital, externally hired managers would perform better in functions where an aspect of 
creativity is included as a performance criterion that employees are rated on. The 
argument holds that because external hires have more experience and education in 
general (Baker et al. 1994, Bidwell 2011, Kauhanen and Napari 2012), not to mention 
occupational and task-specific expertise in the same job position, they would perform 
better in environments requiring creativity. In contexts where creativity is vital, firm-
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specific human capital (which aids in learning speed) might not be an advantage to 
performance as much as occupation/task specific skills and job-related knowledge. 
Therefore, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 4: Job function will moderate the relationship between 
manager hiring origin and performance such that on average, externally 
promoted managers will have higher performance than internally 
promoted managers in creative functions versus non-creative functions. 
1.4. METHODS 
1.4.1. Sample 
The data for this study were drawn from three years of annual surveys 
administered to employees in a public traded firm that operates globally. Employee 
survey data is linked to manager data. Employees span different departments, functions, 
and levels within the firm. The survey was initiated to measure the firm’s progress on 
employee engagement and culture. The survey was administered to all active, full-time 
employees.  
1.4.2. Analytic Approach 
The main hypotheses focus on the comparison between internally promoted 
managers and externally hired managers for different outcomes. I “stacked” the data for 
the three years controlling for year in the models. Therefore, in the main analysis I report 
data on hired managers in each of the three years to represent effects in the year of hire, 
or immediate effects. In the supplementary analysis, I lag the dependent variable one 
year, therefore, I only utilize the data from two time periods. In my analysis, I do not 
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compare hired and tenured managers’ outcomes—although it can be an intriguing 
question—as my interest lies in comparing managers of different hiring origins.  
I used random coefficient modeling with restricted maximum likelihood 
estimation (Bliese, Chan, & Ployhart, 2007; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) to analyze the 
data. The advantage to this type of model is that it accounts for the non-independent, 
hierarchical nature of the data with known sources of variance (e.g. group or team 
affiliation), thereby reducing bias in statistical models (Bliese, 2000; Bliese & Hanges, 
2004; Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). Such models have been identified as particularly useful 
in the context of understanding how organizational actions may affect employees (e.g. 
Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994). The mixed effects models have a random effect 
component. I then compare models to determine whether the random intercept terms are 
relevant to include/exclude in the models. As an example, the multilevel model includes a 
term that accounts for the workgroup which acknowledges that responses from the 
middle managers are nested under a specific workgroup. Functionally, the models will 
“average” all direct report responses by group (Bliese 1998; Bliese 2002; Bliese & 
Ployhart, 2002). 
Before I began the analyses, I checked to see the most appropriate way to test my 
predictions. Following the approach presented by Bliese & Ployhart (2002), I first 
estimate an unconditional means model which does not contain any predictors but 
includes a random intercept variance term for workgroups (operationalized by the 
supervisor’s ID). This model looks at how much variability there is in mean values of the 
dependent variable (i.e., how much variability there is in the intercept) relative to the total 
variability. By default, the function used in the software fits the model by restricted 
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maximum likelihood. The intraclass correlation coefficients (ICC) were 0.13 
(performance), 0.32 (leadership behavior) and .11 (organizational engagement). In 
conclusion, the model that allows for random intercept variation in the dependent 
variable (for all the three outcomes modeled separately) is better than a model that does 
not allow for this random variation. I conduct the analysis using R statistical software (R 
Core Team, 2018). 
1.4.3. Variables 
Middle Manager Hiring Origin. All employees at the firm occupy grades across 
the organization that are central determinants of pay and responsibilities. The grades are 
further organized into bands. Moving from one band to another indicates a job 
promotion, or an upgrade in rank, pay, and managerial responsibilities. The firm had 
three main levels of middle managers, which I refer to as Position Grade 1 (lowest middle 
manager position), Position Grade 2, and Position Grade 3(highest middle manager 
position). I identified an internally promoted manager by coding whether they were 
promoted within the year, coupled with an upgrade of the individual’s band level. To 
identify externally hired managers, I took into account both the band level and tenure 
within the firm. If the employee were employed in the hiring firm for less than one year, 
he/she was coded as an external hire. I then dichotomized the variable (internally 
promoted manager = 0; externally hired manager =1). “In the year of hire” emphasizes 
that the score was taken in the year the managers were hired or promoted. Usually studies 
use a lagged effect to capture such phenomenon, depending on their inquiry. I was 
interested in the immediate consequences and wanted to utilize the data from all the 
years. However, I also recognize that there might be concerns about the time period 
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between the hire data and the survey (e.g. a manager hired one month before the survey 
versus 11 months before the survey). So in addition to controlling for tenure (using days), 
I also conducted a supplementary analysis where I lagged the dependent variables for one 
lagged. In the main analysis, 962 managers were promoted from inside the firm and 115 
were externally hired.  
Organizational Engagement. I used a self-report measure consisting of four items. 
An example of an item is: “I feel energized by my job” (from Schneider, Yost, Kropp, 
Kind, and Lam, 2017). Respondents answered using a five-point scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). An exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory 
factor analysis were performed to check the psychometrics and reliability of the scale 
used (CFI= .98; SRMR = .017). The Cronbach’s alpha for the organizational engagement 
scale was .87. 
Performance. The middle manager’s supervisor evaluates the middle manager 
based on his performance using a Likert scale (5 = exceptional; 4 = exceeded 
expectations; 3 = meets expectations; 2 = improvement needed, and 1 = unsatisfactory). 
The performance ratings reported reflect a holistic evaluation of the person’s 
performance. The mean performance rating was a 3.05 (S.D. 0.73). Any individual with a 
rating of a 0 was removed from the analysis as the scale ranged from 1 to 5 as confirmed 
by the firm. 
Leadership Behavior Quality. Supervisors evaluate the middle managers on 
several criteria related to behaviors that exemplify a high quality leader. The firm has five 
on which most individual employees are evaluated on yearly. Each category is scored out 
of five, and the firm adds them up to form a leadership behavior quality score, which also 
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signals to manager’s their potential career path as a leader. The average score was 19.47 
(S.D.= 2.93), and the minimum score was an 8. I made sure that all the individuals had 
complete scores on all five of the sub-factors; if otherwise, they were excluded from the 
data. The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was .88.  
Creative Function. I dichotomized this variable in the main analysis, where 
employees were marked as 1 if they are working in a creative function, and 0 if they work 
in other functions. In the data, there were 439 newly hired middle managers managing 
creative function, and 638 in other, non-creative functions. 
Covariates. Age has a high impact on the dependent variables and was included as 
a covariate. Age was centered to the mean. Also, because length of service is often 
associated with job performance (Sturman, 2003), I included tenure, measured as the log-
transformed number of days in the unit, which was logged and centered. This also 
accounts for the time individuals were hired and when they took the survey. The firm is 
global, so I had to control for country effects that may influence the results. Country was 
included and dichotomized (1 = USA, 0= Other countries). Position grade is a factor used 
to identify the managerial level. The year was also included as a covariate.  
1.5. RESULTS 
1.5.1. Main Analyses  
Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1.1. There were 962 
managers internally promoted, and 115 were externally hired. There were 439 newly 
hired middle managers leading creative functions, and 638 in the other, non-creative 
functions. The mean age for a middle manager was 42-43 years old (S.D.= 7.76), and the 
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average tenure was about 8 years. Sixty-four percent of the managers worked in the USA, 
while the rest worked in other countries.  
Each outcome was analyzed and presented on separate tables. Hypothesis 1 
predicts that externally hired managers will initially perform lower than internally 
promoted managers. The results are presented in Table 1.2. Model 2 on Table 1.2 shows 
that the relationship was negative and significant (b = -0.27; SE = 0.06; p<0.001), 
supporting Hypothesis 1. This also supports previous findings in literature that the 
performance of external hires is lower than internal hires initially. Hypothesis 2 proposes 
that externally hired managers will initially exhibit higher quality of leadership behaviors 
than internally promoted managers. The results are presented in Table 1.3. Model 2 
shows that the relationship was not significant (b = -0.07; SE = 0.33; n.s.), failing to 
support Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 3 predicted that externally hired managers will initially 
be less organizationally engaged than internally promoted managers. The results are 
presented in Table 1.4 and fail to supports Hypothesis 3 (b = -0.05; SE = 0.08; n.s.). 
In Hypothesis 4, I predicted that job function will moderate the relationship 
between a manager’s hiring origin and performance. Specifically, I propose that 
externally promoted managers will have higher performance than internally promoted 
managers in creative functions as opposed to non-creative functions. Model 3 on Table 
1.2 shows that the interaction between the external hire variable and the creative function 
variable was not significant (b = 0.01; SE = 0.11; n.s.), failing to support Hypothesis 4. 
1.5.2. Supplementary Analyses 
Unpredicted Interactions. Although I did not hypothesize the following 
relationships, I ran models which included interactions of hiring origin and creative 
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functions on the other dependent variables, leadership behaviors and organizational 
engagement. The results are presented on Table 1.3 (Model 3) and Table 1.4 (Model 3). 
The interaction relationship between external hires and creative function was not 
significant for neither leadership behavior quality (b = -0.74; SE = 0.09; n.s.) nor 
organizational engagement (b = -.11; SE = 0.13; n.s.).  
Lagged Model. In the main analysis, the outcome variables reflect the time period 
between the last survey and most recent survey, so I captured the outcomes of the 
manager “within the first year of hire.” In this analysis, I also tested models with a one-
year lag between the year of hire and the outcomes. A year lag may also make sense 
because it takes time for the predictors to reflect on outcomes. The results are presented 
in Table 1.5 (lagged performance), Table 1.6 (lagged leadership behavior quality), and 
Table 1.7 (lagged organizational engagement). The lagged models show that internal 
hires exceeded external hires in performance (Table 1.5, Model 2; b = -0.20; SE = 0.09; 
p<0.05), leadership behaviors (Table 1.6, Model 2; b = -0.95; SE = 0.44; p<0.05), and 
organizational engagement (Table 1.7, Model 2; b = -0.21; SE = 0.10; p<0.05). When 
testing the interaction between the external hire and creative function variables on 
performance (as predicted in hypothesis 4 of the main analysis), the result was not 
significant as shown on Table 1.5, Model 3 (b = -0.07; SE = 0.16; n.s.). However, an 
unpredicted interaction was significant between the external hire and creative function 
variables on the leadership behavior quality outcome (Table 1.6, Model 3 (b = -1.55; SE 
= 0.74; p<0.05), meaning that external hires had lower leadership behavior quality in 





The theoretical contribution as well as the empirical results presented in this 
chapter would be a valuable addition to the “make vs. buy” conversation in many ways. 
First, I advance the “make vs. buy” scholarly conversation by integrating the creativity 
and innovation literature to better understand when to make versus buy managerial 
human capital. I argue that in creative environments firms are better off hiring external 
managers because of the time-lag nature of the requirement and outputs in that 
environment. Second, I use survey data to study the impact of different hiring origins on 
a variety of outcomes. I am able to capture ‘performance’ as a firm-specific criterion for 
evaluating performance, as well as ‘leadership behavior quality,’ which is considered a 
general criterion to evaluate performance. Previous studies have used firm-specific 
criterion to evaluate performance outputs, specifically results subjective performance 
evaluations, which is firm-specific. Looking at organizational engagement allows us to 
uncover the causal mechanisms that can influence performance by understanding why 
performance is affected. I further theorize that the outcome of interest is an important 
factor when studying managerial origin, as I investigate leadership behaviors and 
performance to argue that external hires may excel in other performance-based criteria 
that are more generic, such as leadership quality. Third, the field sample is unique, in that 
it allows us to test the influence of managerial origin in different tasks, including both 
creative jobs and non-creative jobs. While past studies have looked at the financial and 
quick service retail jobs, which are more structured and require less knowledge intensity, 
I theorize and test that finding the benefits of managerial origin lies in matching the 
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manager’s skills with the nature of the performance criteria (general or specific 
performance criteria). 
The results in Chapter 1 promote further investigation of the topic. The main 
analysis of this study confirms what was found in past studies but in a different context: 
internally promoted managers outperformed external hires on the performance variable. 
While previous studies found the results in financial or service firms where immediate 
performance is required (and the employees would most likely be evaluated on firm-
specific performance criteria), the sample used in this paper included diverse jobs where 








Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations of Chapter 1 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Org. Engagement 4.20 0.68          
2. Performance  3.05 0.73 0.06*         
3. Leadership Behavior 19.47 2.93 0.56* -0.01        
4. External Hire (1/0) 0.11 0.41 -0.01 -0.19* -0.55*       
5. Creative Func.(1/0) 0.41 0.49 -0.22* 0.05 -0.05 -0.02      
6. Firm Tenure  7.96 7.06 0.05 -0.01 0.31* -0.5* -0.07*     
7. Age 42.50 7.76 0.06* -0.14* 0.03 0.01 0.1* 0.31*    
8. Female (0/1) 0.53 0.51 0.1* -0.14* 0.05 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05*   
9. Direct Reports 5.51 3.17 0.21* 0.08* -0.01 -0.07* 0.02 0.08* 0.15* 0.11*  
10. Country USA (1/0) 0.64 0.48 -0.0* -0.13* -0.1* 0.05 0.15* 0.07* 0.02 -0.04 -.11* 
N= 1,077 individuals 




Table 1.2: Random Coefficient Model Analyses Predicting Middle Manager Performance 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Intercept 2.34*** 0.05 2.41*** 0.06 2.41*** 0.06 
Year (1 vs 2) 1.21*** 0.04 1.14*** 0.05 1.14*** 0.05 
Year (1 vs 3) 1.21*** 0.04 1.16*** 0.04 1.16*** 0.04 
Country (USA vs Other) -0.13*** 0.04 -0.12*** 0.04 -0.12*** 0.04 
Firm Tenure1,2 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Age2 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
Female (1/0) -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 1) -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.06 0.04 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 3) 0.21 ** 0.07 0.22 ** 0.07 0.22 ** 0.07 
Creative Function (1/0) -0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.07 0.04 
External (1/0) 
  
-0.27*** 0.06 -0.28*** 0.07 
External x Creative Function 
    
0.01 0.11 
Random Effects 
σ2 0.28 0.28 0.28 
τ00 0.01  0.01  0.01  
ICC 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N 794  794  794  
Observations 1077 1077 1077 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.518 / 0.532 0.526 / 0.541 0.526 / 0.541 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
1 Log-transformed 
2 Centered to the mean 
The following were treated as factors and the referent (=1) is listed first, respectively: 
Country (USA vs Other); Female (vs Male); Creative Function (vs Other Functions); 
External (External hire vs Internal hire); Position Grade (Middle Manager Level: 1 = 





Table 1.3: Random Coefficient Model Analyses Predicting Middle Manager Leadership 
Behavior Quality 
  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Intercept 19.85*** 0.29 19.86*** 0.30 19.84*** 0.30 
Year (1 vs 2) 0.07 0.24 0.05 0.25 0.06 0.25 
Year (1 vs 3) -0.15 0.21 -0.16 0.22 -0.15 0.22 
Country (USA vs Other) -0.61** 0.19 -0.61** 0.20 -0.62** 0.20 
Firm Tenure1,2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
Age2 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
Female (1/0) 0.66*** 0.18 0.66*** 0.18 0.66*** 0.18 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 1) 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.21 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 3) 0.24 0.40 0.24 0.40 0.27 0.40 
Creative Function (1/0) -0.98*** 0.19 -0.98*** 0.19 -0.91*** 0.20 
External (1/0) 
  
-0.07 0.33 0.21 0.40 
External x Creative Function 
    
-0.74 0.59 
Random Effects 
σ2 7.35 7.35 7.36 
τ00 0.75  0.75  0.74  
ICC 0.09 0.09 0.09 
N 794  794  794  
Observations 1077 1077 1077 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.065 / 0.151 0.065 / 0.151 0.066 / 0.151 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
1 Log-transformed 
2 Centered to the mean 
The following were treated as factors and the referent (=1) is listed first, respectively: 
Country (USA vs Other); Female (vs Male); Creative Function (vs Other Functions); 
External (External hire vs Internal hire); Position Grade (Middle Manager Level: 1 = 




Table 1.4: Random Coefficient Model Analyses Predicting Middle Manager 
Organizational Engagement  
  
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Intercept 4.35*** 0.07 4.36*** 0.07 4.36*** 0.07 
Year (1 vs 2) 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 
Year (1 vs 3) -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 
Country (USA vs Other) -0.09 * 0.04 -0.09 * 0.04 -0.09 * 0.04 
Firm Tenure1,2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 * 0.00 
Female (1/0) 0.10 * 0.04 0.10 * 0.04 0.10 * 0.04 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 1) -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 3) 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.09 0.14 0.09 
Creative Function (1/0) -0.30*** 0.04 -0.30*** 0.04 -0.29*** 0.04 
External (1/0) 
  
-0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.09 
External x Creative Function 
    
-0.11 0.13 
Random Effects 
σ2 0.39 0.39 0.39 
τ00 0.03  0.03  0.03  
ICC 0.07 0.06 0.06 
N 794  794  794  
Observations 1077 1077 1077 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.072 / 0.133 0.072 / 0.132 0.073 / 0.130 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
1 Log-transformed 
2 Centered to the mean 
The following were treated as factors and the referent (=1) is listed first, respectively: 
Country (USA vs Other); Female (vs Male); Creative Function (vs Other Functions); 
External (External hire vs Internal hire); Position Grade (Middle Manager Level: 1 = 




Table 1.5: Supplementary Analyses: Linear Regression Predicting Lagged Middle 
Manager Performance 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Intercept 3.52*** 0.07 3.58*** 0.08 3.57*** 0.08 
Year -0.12 * 0.05 -0.16** 0.06 -0.16** 0.06 
Country (USA vs Other) -0.12 * 0.06 -0.11 * 0.06 -0.11 * 0.06 
Firm Tenure1,2 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 * 0.00 -0.01 * 0.00 
Age2 -0.02*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 
Female (1/0) 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 1) -0.12 0.06 -0.13 * 0.06 -0.13 * 0.06 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 3) 0.42*** 0.11 0.44*** 0.11 0.44*** 0.11 
Creative Function (1/0) -0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.04 0.06 
External (1/0) 
  
-0.20 * 0.09 -0.18 0.11 
External x Creative Function (1/0) 
    
-0.07 0.16 
Observations 589 589 589 
R2 / R2 adjusted 0.078 / 0.065 0.085 / 0.071 0.085 / 0.070 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
1 Log-transformed 
2 Centered to the mean 
The following were treated as factors and the referent (=1) is listed first, respectively: 
Country (USA vs Other); Female (vs Male); Creative Function (vs Other Functions); 
External (External hire vs Internal hire); Position Grade (Middle Manager Level: 1 = 





Table 1.6: Supplementary Analyses: Random Coefficient Model Analyses Predicting 
Lagged Middle Manager Leadership Behavior Quality 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Intercept 20.94*** 0.35 21.19*** 0.37 21.12*** 0.37 
Year 0.12 0.25 -0.11 0.27 -0.10 0.27 
Country (USA vs Other) -0.60 * 0.27 -0.55 * 0.27 -0.55 * 0.27 
Firm Tenure1,2 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
Age2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Female (1/0) -0.84*** 0.24 -0.85*** 0.24 -0.85*** 0.24 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 1) -0.37 0.30 -0.38 0.30 -0.41 0.29 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 3) -0.22 0.56 -0.14 0.56 -0.03 0.55 
Creative Function (1/0) -1.32*** 0.26 -1.38*** 0.26 -1.20*** 0.28 
External (1/0) 
  
-0.95 * 0.44 -0.45 0.50 
External x Creative Function  
    
-1.55 * 0.74 
Random Effects 
σ2 6.86 6.73 6.88 
τ00 1.61  1.68  1.47  
ICC 0.19 0.20 0.18 
N 473  473  473  
Observations 589 589 589 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.085 / 0.258 0.092 / 0.273 0.099 / 0.257 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
1 Log-transformed 
2 Centered to the mean 
The following were treated as factors and the referent (=1) is listed first, respectively: 
Country (USA vs Other); Female (vs Male); Creative Function (vs Other Functions); 
External (External hire vs Internal hire); Position Grade (Middle Manager Level: 1 = 






Table 1.7: Supplementary Analyses: Random Coefficient Model Analyses Predicting 
Lagged Middle Manager Organizational Engagement  
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Intercept 4.49 *** 0.08 4.54 *** 0.08 4.53 *** 0.08 
Year 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 
Country (USA vs Other) -0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 0.06 
Firm Tenure1,2 0.01 * 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Female (1/0) -0.16 ** 0.05 -0.16 ** 0.05 -0.16 ** 0.05 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 1) -0.10 0.07 -0.10 0.07 -0.11 0.07 
Position Grade (Level 2 vs 3) -0.05 0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.01 0.12 
Creative Function (1/0) -0.39 *** 0.06 -0.41 *** 0.06 -0.38 *** 0.06 
External (1/0) 
  
-0.21 * 0.10 -0.14 0.11 
External x Function 
    
-0.22 0.17 
Random Effects 
σ2 0.35 0.34 0.35 
τ00 0.08   0.08   0.07   
ICC 0.18 0.18 0.17 
N 473   473   473   
Observations 589 589 589 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.112 / 0.272 0.119 / 0.277 0.122 / 0.273 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
1 Log-transformed 
2 Centered to the mean 
The following were treated as factors and the referent (=1) is listed first, respectively: 
Country (USA vs Other); Female (vs Male); Creative Function (vs Other Functions); 




CHAPTER 2: THE SOCIAL INFLUENCE OF MAKING VERSUS BUYING 
MANAGERIAL HUMAN CAPITAL ON SUBORDINATE OUTCOMES 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Organizational research is increasingly considering the importance of studying the 
social influence that HR practices and decisions have on third-party stakeholders (or 
entities that are not directly involved in or targeted in the HR decision/practice; Ho and 
Levesque, 2005; Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012; Maltarich, Nyberg, Reilly, Abdulsalam, 
& Martin, 2017). Hiring events may have an influence on unit performance (e.g. Collins 
& Smith 2006; Delery & Doty 1996; Huselid, 1995) by indirectly influencing the 
perceptions and behaviors of other employees in the firm. While extant theoretical 
literature contributes to the understanding of the hired or promoted person’s individual 
performance outcomes (e.g. Bidwell, 2011), how third parties who are not the focal 
individuals hired, such as subordinates, perceive and experience the hiring decision 
remains little understood. The influence of hiring decisions on subordinates is important 
to study because first, these employees are assumed to comprise the majority of the firm. 
Second, after witnessing the process and outcomes of the hiring decisions, mechanisms 
that influence job performance, such as expectancies, perceptions, and attitude, might 
change as a response. Therefore, in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I advance the literature 
on staffing and the “make vs. buy” argument by exploring the social influence associated 
with hiring decisions. Specifically, I integrate psychology and economic rationale to 
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study the impact of the hiring origin of middle managers on subordinate behaviors, affect, 
and performance.  
This chapter contributes to literature in three ways. First, I challenge the assumed 
role of firm-specific human capital as a source of sustained competitive advantage by 
identifying boundary conditions where occupation specific capital would be more 
valuable. I do so by studying the influence of managerial hiring on subordinates, who 
were not the center of attention in previous studies. Subordinates are important to study 
because they comprise the majority of the firm and are strongly and directly influenced 
by managerial hiring decisions. Therefore, it is important to investigate how subordinate 
perceptions of the middle manager’s origin may drive behavior and attitudes, beyond that 
of the hired individual. Although DeOrtentiis et al. (2018) have looked at newly hired 
managers’ effect on unit performance measures, this study focuses on the subordinates’ 
individual performance, attitudes, and behaviors, reflecting common situations where 
employees are evaluated on individual performance measures vs unit or group measures. 
This further advances the “make vs. buy” scholarly conversation by depicting when to 
make versus when to buy managerial human capital based on their influence on 
subordinates. Second, I use survey data to capture the psychological states of employees 
beyond performance measures. This allows us to uncover the causal mechanisms that can 
influence performance by understanding why performance is affected. Third, the field 
sample includes different employee groups in different departments. Previous studies that 
looked at internally promoted and externally hired employees tended to use samples from 
jobs with tasks that did not require creativity or heavy knowledge. Therefore, I use a 
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wider range of occupations to examine the different outcomes that might act as boundary 
conditions to the main relationship. 
2.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In addition to the literature review in Chapter 1, I include below a literature 
review that pertains to topics of this chapter that were not included previously. 
2.2.1. Middle Manager Human Capital 
The decision to hire a middle manager carries both individual-level and unit-level 
consequences (DeOrtentiis et al., 2018; Hale, Ployhart, & Shepherd, 2016; Hausknecht & 
Holwerda, 2013).  Most leadership-related literature posits that a middle manager’s 
human capital can significantly influence unit and organizational performance (Cellar, 
Goudy, and O’Brien, 2001; Connelly, Gilbert, Zaccaro, Threlfall, Marks, & Mumford, 
2000; Crook et al., 2011; Gerstner & Day, 1997; Judge, Piccolo, & Ilies, 2004; Lowe, 
Kroeck & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; Osborn & Vicars, 1976). For example, Mollick’s 
(2012) study found that middle managers in the computer game industry accounted for 
22% of the variance in revenue. The objective of middle managers is to influence 
subordinates to achieve goals for the individual, group, or organization. The middle 
manager’s human capital is an important source of this influence (Yukl, 2001). Different 
human capital measures that influence the impact of the manager’s behavior on 
subordinate outcomes have been identified, including the manager’s expertise (e.g.  
Podsakoff, Todor & Schuler, 1983), competence (e.g.  Price & Garland, 1981), gender 
(e.g.  Cellar, Goudy, and O’Brien, 2001; Osborn & Vicars, 1976), and personality (e.g. 
agreeableness, Cellar, Sidle, Goudy, and O’Brien, 2001).  
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There is also literature based on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), which 
explores the impact of the supervisor-subordinate relationship quality on both individual 
and organizational outcomes (LMX theory; Graen and Uhl-Bien, 1995). However, this 
paper focuses on the human capital influence of managers on subordinates in terms of the 
manager’s hiring origin, and though the relationship quality between the two parties is 
not within the scope of this paper, it is nevertheless an important point to emphasize the 
impact of middle managers on subordinates.  
2.2.2. Subordinate Group 
I conceptualize a group of subordinates (subordinate group) as employees that 
work independent of each other to achieve their goals while supervised by the same 
manager. Thus, even though they might not share immediate goals, work, or 
accountability, they share a similar mentoring and control system, wherein the same 
manager assigns their tasks, provides guidance, gives feedback, and evaluates their 
performance, making them more homogenous than other employees working under a 
different manager. While the concept might overlap with teams, teams are composed of 
three or more individuals working on a specific performance objective, sharing common 
goals, and similar purpose (Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). The team’s 
work activities must be more formally coordinated, and their performance is typically 
collectively evaluated when compared to workgroup members, which operate more 
independently from one another. 
2.2.3. Social Influence of Hiring Origin 
There is rich evidence in a variety of research streams that social influence is a 
widespread phenomenon in organizations, as demonstrated by studies in social 
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information processing (e.g., Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978, Zalesny & Ford, 1990) and social 
influence and comparison (e.g., Festinger 1954). Furthermore, social influence has been 
found to occur even in instances where objective information is available (Klein, 1997). 
A recent wave in management research highlight the importance of studying the social 
influence that HR practices and decisions have on employee reactions, behaviors, and 
performance (Abdulsalam et al., 2018; Ho, 2005; Gubler, Larkin, and Pierce, 2016; Ho 
and Levesque, 2015; Larkin, Pierce, & Gino, 2012; Maltarich et al., 2017). For example, 
Abdulsalam and colleagues (working paper) investigated how pay-for-performance (PFP) 
decisions can influence employees who witness underperforming employees get special 
treatment. Even though the focal employees are not directly affected by the special 
treatment, the authors found a significant reaction experienced by the group members 
after the special treatment that influenced the unit’s performance. Larkin, Pierce, and 
Gino (2012) used social comparison theory to explain how the pay of others can 
influence agency theory’s predictions. Specifically, they propose how psychological costs 
that occur from comparing others’ pay may reduce the efficacy of individual PFP. Ho and 
Levesque (2005) study how social influence, specifically other coworkers, drives beliefs 
and evaluations of psychological contract fulfillment of employees.  
Research on job promotions gets us close to understanding the social effects of 
the hiring origin and specifically the costs of internal hiring. For example, because 
organizations have a continuing relationship with the internal candidates who were not 
selected for the job promotion, these passed-over individuals may become dissatisfied 
and turnover from the organization (Spector & Fox, 2010), become envious 
(Schaubroeck and Lam, 2004), or exemplify counterproductive work behaviors (Lam and 
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Schaubroeck, 2000). There is also evidence that the number of complaints and grievances 
related to promotions becomes significantly high (Allen, 1997). This is not a concern 
with external selection because the organization does not have a continuing relationship 
with external candidates who are not selected.  
Despite the progress, there is still more to learn about the reactions of 
subordinates who do not directly receive/get denied a promotion but are influenced by the 
decision. As scholars have deemed internal promotions as high-performance-work 
practice and shown their effect on firm performance (e.g. Collins & Smith 2006; Delery 
& Doty 1996; Delaney and Huselid 1996; Guest et al. 2003; Huselid, 1995), it becomes 
even more important to understand how promotions translate to organizational outcomes. 
Indeed, these firm-level results point to the fact that job promotions also influence the 
perceptions and behaviors of other employees in the workgroup. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the social influence promotions have on other workers, beyond 
those individual employees who lost/won the tournament. Therefore, this study adds to 
this stream of research by arguing that the selection decisions related to the manager’s 
hiring origin carry a spillover effect by influencing the perceptions and behaviors of 
subordinates in the workgroup managed by the newly hired or promoted manager. 
Hiring Origin and Unit Outcomes. The social influence of the hiring origin of the 
middle manager can also be captured by studying unit level outcomes. A scarce number 
of studies look at unit-level measures that are related to middle manager selection 
decisions. Below I highlight studies that examine the relationship between the origin of 
hire and unit-level outcomes.  
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Using a sample of law firms, Kor and Leblebici (2005) looked at complementary 
features between external versus internal employees (called origin of hiring of associates) 
and the firm’s strategies (human capital development and geographical strategies) on the 
firm’s profitability. They did not find direct evidence that hiring internal associates is 
more beneficial to unit performance than hiring external associates. The study did find 
however an interaction effect, wherein the relationship between the hiring origin of 
associates and firm performance relied upon the firm’s human capital development 
strategies. 
A study by Reilly and colleagues (2014) also used the firm-specific human capital 
advantage logic when predicting the difference between the immediate effect of hiring 
rates (external hires) and transfer-in rates (internal hires) on patient satisfaction (their 
Hypothesis 3c). The study did not find support for the relationship; there is no evidence 
that there is a difference between external and internal hiring rates on immediate patient 
satisfaction. However, the study also hypothesized and found that the positive effect of 
hiring rates on patient satisfaction lasted longer than the positive effect of transfer-in rates 
that didn’t exceed 5 months on patient satisfaction. This was attributed to the idea that 
external hires have a more innovative perspective than internal hires. 
Another study looking at 185 women’s Division I basketball coaches over time 
found that the origin of the new coach (whether insider or outsider) did not matter, as 
they all had approximately the same subsequent performance results, as measured by 
team wins (Pierce, Johnson, Krohn, & Judge, 2017). Overall, these results (or lack 




Among service firms, DeOrtentiis and colleagues (2018) found that the benefits of 
internally selected and externally hired middle managers depended on whether the unit 
outcome was measured by a firm-specific or general criterion. Internally hired managers 
had higher service performance (firm-specific criterion) than externally hired managers, 
and the two types of managers showed similar financial performance (general criterion). 
They also found that externally hired managers’ unit performance grew faster over time 
than the performance of internally promoted managers.  
2.3. HYPOTHESES 
In Chapter 1 of this manuscript, I used signaling theory to argue that a promotion 
from within is predicted to increase the promoted manager’s organizational engagement. 
However, studies in job promotion literature have focused on the social influence of job 
promotions, specifically studying the reactions and behaviors of the individuals passed 
over for a promotion (in other words, qualified employees who were not selected for the 
job promotion). Because organizations have a continuing relationship with the passed-
over employees, inequity perception will likely trigger negative feelings and behaviors, 
leading to turnover consequences (Spector & Fox, 2010), envy (Schaubroeck and Lam, 
2004), and devious work behaviors (Lam and Schaubroeck, 2000) among the passed-over 
employees. More often than not, there would also be other employees in the unit that do 
not qualify for the promotion but are indirectly influenced by the decision. It is still 
unclear how subordinates who do not receive the promotion themselves or do not qualify 
for the promotion would be influenced by the decision. Therefore, I attempt to increase 
understanding in this area by studying the influence of the middle manager’s hiring origin 
on his or her subordinate’s organizational engagement and job performance ratings.  
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2.3.1. Hiring Origin & Subordinate Organizational Engagement 
In this section, I predict that subordinates would be more engaged if the manager 
were promoted from within the firm. First, seeing an internal employee promoted signals 
to the subordinates that the firm values its employees and provides career advancement 
opportunities. A meta-analytic finding indicated that satisfaction with promotion 
opportunities in the firm increased organizational commitment (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990; 
Wayne et al., 1997). 
First, seeing an internal employee promoted signals to the subordinates that the 
firm values its employees and provides career advancement opportunities. A meta-
analytic finding indicated that satisfaction with promotion opportunities in the firm 
increased organizational commitment (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). Second, knowledge 
about the firm’s policies, procedures, and culture allows a smooth transition to the new 
job and leading employees. Subordinates will perceive the manager as more competent 
because he/she has an understanding of the internal dynamics of the firm. This would 
also allow the leader to perform immediately, as he/she would not need as much time to 
be accommodated. Third, because internally promoted managers would have a boost in 
organizational engagement, after the promotion which may be salient in his/her behavior, 
a spillover effect or contagion may ensue, wherein subordinates would also have high 
organizational engagement. 
Externally hired managers might be perceived as change agents by their 
subordinates; hence, subordinates would not feel as engaged when rules and policies 
change. Additionally, externally hired managers would need more time to get 
accommodated to the new firm, which may frustrate subordinates who usually look to the 
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leader for quick answers to problems. For example, a manager understands the skills and 
habits of his/her subordinates from day one, he/she would be able to manage and work 
with them more effectively and efficiently, which would reflect on the subordinate’s 
individual performance. External hires would need more time to understand his/her 
subordinates’ skills, abilities, expectations, and habits. 
Hypothesis 5: On average, subordinate groups with an externally hired manager 
will have lower organizational engagement than subordinate groups with an 
internally promoted manager. 
2.3.2. Hiring Origin & Subordinate Group Performance 
Perceptual Congruence. Internally promoted managers had prior experience 
working in the firm. This means that internally promoted managers and their subordinates 
would have greater similarity in perception about both the work environment and 
expected behaviors, in other words, higher perceptual congruence, when compared with 
externally hired managers. Perceptual congruence between managers and subordinates is 
important because it influences whether employees would react in an expected manner to 
decisions. Perceiving the environment congruently allows the subordinate to better 
anticipate what will be rewarded by the supervisor, and to behave accordingly (Greene, 
1972; Wexley et al., 1980). Bowen & Ostroff (2004) and Nishii & Wright (2008) suggest 
that in order for HR practices to exert their desired effect on employee attitudes and 
behaviors, they must first be perceived and interpreted by employees. However, because 
perceptions are subjective, not all employees will interpret the HR practice as intended by 
the manager. Therefore, there would be variance in the effect of HR practices on 
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employees because of the varied meanings that employees attach to those practices, and 
because not all employees will interpret the HR system similarly.  
Perceptual congruence in how the manager and subordinate interpret the work 
environment and requirements (including the reward system, the performance evaluation 
expectations, etc.) would most likely occur between internally promoted managers and 
their subordinates because they have shared experience in the firm, and thus, would more 
likely have a homogenous view of the work environment and intangible factors than 
externally hired managers and their subordinates (Bowen & Ostroff, 2004; Nishii & 
Wright (2008). Therefore, subordinates are more likely to interpret the environment and 
act in ways that are in line with their manager’s expectations. Congruence of supervisor 
and subordinate perceptions of the demands and characteristics of the work environment 
was linked to greater subordinate satisfaction and performance ratings (Bernardin, 1097; 
Greene, 1972; Turban & Jones, 1988; Wexley et al., 1980). Some studies even found a 
stronger effect of perceptual congruence than actual demographic similarity between 
managers and their subordinates (e.g. Murphy & Ensher, 1999; Wexley et al., 1980). 
Therefore, I hypothesize that because of the high perceptual congruence between 
internally promoted managers and their subordinates, there would be higher performance 
ratings of subordinates. Subordinates of externally hired managers tend to have a hard 
time interpreting the environment and HR practices in the same way as intended by the 
external manager. Therefore, internally promoted candidates not only have firm-specific 
knowledge beneficial for his/her performance, they also influence their subordinates by 
having perceptual congruence, which is necessary in order for HR practices to exert their 
desired effect on employee attitudes and behaviors. 
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Hypothesis 6: On average, subordinate groups with an externally hired manager 
will have lower performance than subordinate groups with an internally 
promoted manager.   
2.3.3. Hiring Origin, Subordinate Group Organizational Engagement, & Creative 
Function  
Putting the right middle manager in the right place is key not only to achieve 
positive individual outcomes, but also to achieve positive collective outcomes. Therefore, 
it is important to understand the conditions under which one origin of hiring might 
influence subordinates more/less positively than the other. I propose that in job functions 
requiring creativity (moderator), externally hired managers might exceed internally 
promoted managers in their influence on subordinates’ organizational engagement and 
performance. I argue that subordinates of externally hired managers will be more 
organizationally engaged than subordinates of internally promoted managers in creative 
job functions. This is because of two reasons: opportunity to learn and having a 
supportive environment. 
Subordinate Learning. Unlike internally promoted individuals, external hires are 
less likely to experience more or different kinds of responsibilities from their previous 
positions as they are most likely to be hired in a position that has the same level/job title 
in the hiring firm than in their previous firm (Bidwell and Mollick, 2015; DeVaro, 
Kauhanen, & Valmari, 2019). Because external hires typically originate from the same 
job position/level they had in the previous firm, external hires would have higher 
occupation-specific or task-specific capital when compared with internally promoted 
hires (Kambourov and Manovskii 2009; Gathmann and Schonberg 2010), which 
information is portable across firms (Cassidy, 2017;Kambourov & Manovskii 
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2009; Gathmann & Schönberg, 2010). With creative and knowledge-based job functions, 
an externally hired manager with occupational specific human capital would be perceived 
by subordinates as more capable than firm specific human capital. Not only do externally 
hired managers bring new ideas to the table that contribute to their individual 
performance, they also add new and unique knowledge, skills, and abilities to the unit. 
The knowledge external hires possess seems scarce and unique, which heightens its 
perceived value (Cialdini 2001). This learning opportunity allows subordinates to gain 
advantage over other employees (from the internal and external labor market), in terms of 
personal self-enhancement and learning, which would increase their organizational 
engagement. Subordinates would be organizationally engaged and motivated to learn 
from the external managers in order to compete in the market without facing costs, and 
their value would increase if they decide to find a new job. This is especially true given 
the fact that when hiring external employees, firm tend to choose individuals with high 
occupational expertise. On the other hand, firms train internally promoted managers into 
the new role, and while they have firm specific skills, occupational expertise would come 
over time; this means that both the manager and the subordinate will be learning, and the 
subordinates would not perceive the manager as an expert.  
Supportive Environment. One of the benefits of external hires is that they are 
often more objective and less emotional about tough decisions, making their perception 
by their subordinates seem fairer when compared to a manager with social capital in the 
firm who might be accused of carrying some bias. This is especially important in creative 
functions, wherein diverse ideas, conflicts, and problem-solving are keys to succeed. 
Therefore, the external manager is more likely to foster an innovative climate and 
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supportive environment where subordinates can make a contribution. This, in turn, would 
increase their organizational engagement.  
Hypothesis 7: Job function will moderate the relationship between manager 
hiring origin and subordinate group organizational engagement such that on 
average, subordinate groups with an externally hired manager will have higher 
organizational engagement than subordinate groups with an internally promoted 
manager in creative functions. 
2.3.4. Hiring Origin, Subordinate Group Performance, & Creative Functions 
Employee creativity, defined as developing products and processes that are both 
novel and useful (Amabile, 1988), is found to be an important determinant for 
organizations to compete in the marketplace (Zhou & Shalley, 2010). Since creativity is, 
in part, the result of social processes, middle managers can have a noteworthy effect on 
employees’ creativity (Amabile & Pillemer; Byrne, Mumford, Barrett, & Vessey, 2009; 
Amabile, Schatzel, Moneta, & Kramer, 2004; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004). I argue 
that the middle manager’s hiring origin represents a particularly powerful influence. 
Specifically, I propose that subordinates of externally hired managers will have higher 
performance ratings when in creative job functions. 
Leading employees to perform more creatively is often different from traditional 
leadership approaches, because creativity requires a unique set of conditions, such as 
having tolerance for failure and a supportive environment (Vessey, Barrett, Mumford, 
Johnson, & Litwiller, 2014). Because external hires typically originate from the same job 
position/level they had in the previous firm, external hires would have higher occupation-
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specific skills in a creative environment when compared to internally promoted hires 
(Kambourov and Manovskii 2009; Gathmann and Schönberg 2010). Occupation-specific 
skills are the general skills and expertise required to perform a particular job, regardless 
of the firm. Hence, unlike firm-specific skills, occupation-specific skills are portable 
across firms (Gibbons and Waldman 2004, 2006; Kambourov and Manovskii 
2009; Gathmann and Schönberg 2010; Cassidy 2017). Although many variables 
influence creativity and innovation (Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, and Strange, 2002), a 
literature review by Mumford and colleagues (2002) which examined leadership 
behaviors contributing to creativity and innovation in organizational settings found that 
leadership of creative people requires, most importantly, expertise. Thamhai and 
Gemmill (1974) looked at project managers in an electronic company and found that 
managerial expertise was associated with higher project manager performance ratings, as 
well as a climate of involvement and willingness to disagree, both crucial mechanisms of 
a successful creative environment.  
The externally hired manager would have the occupation-specific skills and 
expertise needed for performance in creative environments when compared with 
internally promoted managers. For example, a supervisor with creative problem-solving 
skills was found to be capable of giving better feedback, was perceived as a role model 
for creativity, and was viewed as more credible (Mumford and colleagues, 2002). Also, 
Reiter-Palmon and Illies (2004) argued that a supervisor’s own creative skills were 
significant to the subordinates’ creative problem-solving. A creative mentor has been 
found to positively impact individuals’ creative development during their careers 
(Simonton, 1975; Torrance, 1988). Additionally, creative supervisors who can recognize 
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and define problems in novel and useful ways can set specific creativity expectations and 
goals for their subordinates, which can facilitate their employees’ creativity (Hemlin & 
Olsson, 2011; Mainemelis, Kark, & Epitropaki, 2015; Mumford, Connelly, & Gaddis, 
2003; Shalley, 1991). Supervisors with higher levels of creativity set higher creativity 
expectations for their employees, and tolerated mistakes made by subordinates during the 
idea-creation stage of a project (Huang et al., 2016). Findings by Jaussi & Dionne 
(2003) also suggest that subordinates who perceive their leader as a role model for 
creativity displayed more creativity when the leader showed new/unconventional 
behavior. 
Additionally, there is evidence that employee perceptions of the work 
environment created by their team leaders and, in particular, their perceptions of 
knowledge support, relate to employee creativity (e.g., Oldham & Cummings, 
1996, Scott & Bruce, 1994). This is especially true, as subordinates would have higher 
competence perceptions towards a new manager in a creative environment than toward an 
internally hired manager. Therefore, while internally promoted managers may have an 
initial advantage over externals by seeing eye-to-eye with subordinates, the occupation-
specific expertise of the external hire will drive employees to perform better in 
environments where creativity is essential. Because of the unique features of creatively 
demanding functions, a leader with occupation-specific expertise would be more 
positively influential on his/her subordinates than one with firm-specific skills. 
Hypothesis 8: Job function will moderate the relationship between manager 
hiring origin and group performance such that on average subordinate groups 
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with an externally hired manager will have higher performance than subordinate 
groups with an internally promoted manager in creative functions. 
2.4. METHODS 
2.4.1. Sample and Variables 
The data for this study was the same as that in Chapter 1, except that in this 
chapter, I am only interested in the outcomes of the subordinates of newly hired 
managers (internal or external hires). Please refer to Chapter 1 for a detailed description 
of the sample. 
Please refer to Chapter 1 for the list of variables. The only difference is the 
sample used (outcomes of subordinates), otherwise, I utilized the same scales and proxies 
to test the hypotheses. Because the data is nested and the independent variable is a unit 
property, the coefficients in the results will represent the response/output of the average 
individual subordinate in the workgroup. I then validate the measures using intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC) values, which test how much of the variability in individual 
responses can be predicted by workgroup membership or the manager. 
2.4.2. Analytical Approach 
My hypotheses focus on comparing the responses of subordinate groups toward 
their newly hired manager. To examine these changes, my approach mirrors the one used 
in Chapter 1, but in this case, I measured the responses of the average individual within 
the group (subordinate group) rather than of the hired manager. The intraclass correlation 
coefficients (ICC) were 0.10 (performance) and .13 (organizational engagement). In 
conclusion, the model that allows for random intercept variation in the dependent 




Descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 2.1. Overall, the 
sample included around 2,100 subordinates nested under around 460 middle managers 
who were hired sometime within the three-year period of the sample. Of those middle 
managers, 115 were externally hired and the rest were promoted from inside the firm.  
Hypothesis 5 predicts that subordinates with internally promoted managers will 
have higher organizational engagement than externally hired managers. The results are 
presented in Table 2.1, Model 2. The relationship was significant (b = -0.14; SE = 0.06; 
p<0.05) supporting Hypothesis 5. This means that internally promoted managers had on 
average higher organizational engagement than the average individual subordinate 
managed by an externally hired manager.  
Hypothesis 6 proposes an interaction effect of this main relationship, wherein I 
argue that in creative functions, subordinates of externally hired managers would be more 
engaged. Table 2.1, Model 3 shows that the prediction was not supported (b = -0.10; SE = 
0.08; n.s.). Model 3 shows that the relationship was not significant, failing to support 
Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 7 and 8 make predictions about performance outcomes of 
subordinates. Hypothesis 7 states that subordinates of internally hired managers would 
perform better in general, but when in a creative environment, externally hired managers 
might be better able to lead their team and reflect on their performance. The results for 
both these hypotheses are presented in Table 2.2, Models 2 and Model 3. Both results 
were not significant, failing to support Hypothesis 7 (b = -0.04; SE = 0.04; n.s.) and 




In this chapter, I pursued understanding the social influence of hiring decisions in 
terms of manager origin. Specifically, this study focuses on the average subordinate 
group performance and attitudes within the middle manager’s first year of hire. I 
attempted to make a theoretical contribution and add to the “make vs buy” scholarly 
conversation by taking into account subordinates, who have been rarely studied, yet are 
heavily influenced by their manager’s knowledge and skills. Their initial reactions get us 
close to understanding the perception of employees with regard to different facets of 
human capital. Second, I use survey data to capture the psychological states of employees 
beyond performance measures, which has been the focus of past studies. Studying 
affective reactions is a valuable and rare opportunity that can further inform the field of 
study. The sample includes different employee groups in varied departments. Previous 
studies that examined internally promoted and externally hired employees tended to use 
samples from jobs with tasks that generally did not require a heavy knowledge-base or 
creativity (e.g. financial and retail-service jobs). Therefore, I use a wider range of 
occupations to examine the different outcomes that might act as boundary conditions to 
the main relationship. 
The insignificant results failed to support my theory, which relied on the idea that 
occupational skills would be more valuable than firm-specific knowledge in 
environments where creativity and innovation are evaluated in a lagged manner. 
However, there were several lessons that might add to the “make vs. buy” conversation. 
It seems that the firm-specific human capital the middle manager possesses influences 
subordinates more positively than the externally hired manager with occupational skills. 
 
64 
However, it is worth further exploring the changes in behaviors and attitudes of 
subordinates. Such a prediction would revolve around predicting the relevant changes 
that might occur as opposed to the absolute changes (e.g. Lang & Bliese, 2016); 
modeling the time the manager is hired as an event and showing how the subordinates 







Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations of Chapter 2 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Org. Engagement 4.03 0.77         
2. Performance  2.91 0.74 0.10*        
3. External Manager 0.25 0.43 -0.06* -0.02       
4. Country USA  0.51 0.50 -0.04 -0.13* -0.05*      
5. Group Size 25.91 10.78 0.04* -0.03 0.05* -0.03     
6. Creative Function  0.31 0.46 -0.06* 0.02 0.12* 0.12* 0.03    
7. Manager Female  0.37 0.48 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.08* -0.05* 0.00   
8. Manager Age 45.19 6.60 -0.01 0.00 0.05* 0.19* 0.06* 0.25* 0.05*  
9. Manager Tenure 8.50 2.87 0.02 -0.12* -0.55* 0.02 -0.01 -0.11* 0.11* -0.07* 
10. Female 0.52 0.50 -0.01 0.04* 0.05* -0.04* 0.01 0.06* 0.10* -0.05* 
11. Age 43.22 5.55 -0.01 -0.11* -0.05* 0.4* 0.06* 0.06* 0.02 0.35* 
12. Tenure 8.82 8.56 -0.02 -0.09* -0.07* 0.15* -0.01 -0.04* -0.04 0.11* 
N= 481 subordinate groups. 







Table 2.1 (continued): Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations of Chapter 2 
Variable 9 10 11 
10. Female (0/1) 0.00   
11. Age 0.03 -0.11*  
12. Tenure 0.03 -0.13* 0.35* 
N= 481 subordinate groups. 




Table 2.2: Random Coefficient Model Analyses Predicting Managerial Hiring Origin and 
Subordinate Group Organizational Engagement 
 
  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Intercept 3.81 *** 0.22 3.89 *** 0.22 3.80 *** 0.22 
Country USA (1/0) -0.16 *** 0.05 -0.15 ** 0.05 -0.13 * 0.05 
Group Size -0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 
Creative Function (1/0) -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Manager Female (1/0) -0.09 0.05 -0.09 * 0.05 -0.09 0.05 
Manager Position Grade 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 0.04 *** 0.01 
Manager Age2 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 
Manager Tenure1,2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female (1/0) -0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.06 -0.07 0.06 
Age2 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Tenure1,2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Position Grade -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Manager External (1/0) 
  
-0.14 * 0.06 
  
Manager External x Creative 
Function 
    
-0.10 0.08 
Random Effects 
σ2 0.52 0.52 0.52 
τ00 0.07  0.07  0.07   
ICC 0.12 0.11 0.12 
N 481  481  481  
Observations 2292 2292 2292 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.021 / 0.136 0.024 / 0.136 0.021 / 0.136 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
1 Log-transformed 




Table 2.3: Random Coefficient Model Analyses Predicting Managerial Hiring Origin and 
Subordinate Group Performance 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Predictors Estimates SE Estimates SE Estimates SE 
Intercept 2.08 *** 0.15 2.10 *** 0.15 2.07 *** 0.15 
Country USA (1/0) 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 
Group Size 1.03 *** 0.03 1.02 *** 0.03 1.02 *** 0.03 
Creative Function (1/0) -0.01 ** 0.00 -0.01 ** 0.00 -0.01 ** 0.00 
Manager Female (1/0) -0.10 ** 0.03 -0.10 ** 0.03 -0.10 ** 0.03 
Manager Position Grade 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 0.03 *** 0.01 
Manager Age2 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 
Manager Tenure1,2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female (1/0) 1.10 *** 0.04 1.09 *** 0.04 1.09 *** 0.04 
Age2 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Tenure1,2 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
Position Grade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 




Manager External x Creative 
Function 
    
-0.05 0.05 
Random Effects 
σ2 0.31 0.31 0.31 
τ00 0.02  0.02  0.02  
ICC 0.05 0.05 0.05 
N 467  467  467  
Observations 2121 2121 2121 
Marginal R2 / Conditional R2 0.423 / 0.451 0.424 / 0.451 0.423 / 0.451 
* p<0.05   ** p<0.01   *** p<0.001 
1 Log-transformed 
2 Centered to the mean 
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CHAPTER 3: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
3.1. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This study contributes to practical managerial selection decisions when it comes 
to understanding the strategic opportunities and gains of hiring the right people in the 
right places. As firms are currently hiring employees and building pipelines 
simultaneously without understanding the real consequences modelled in the research and 
without theoretical guidance, losses from their decisions will surely reflect on their 
bottom line. For example, Keller & Bidwell (2015) found that managers are actually the 
wrong people at the wrong place; most jobs requiring firm specific skills were filled with 
employees with general skills and vice-versa. The consequences also have spillover effect 
on other employees in the unit. As I found in Chapter 2, employees feel organizationally 
attached if their manager is internally promoted. Therefore, managers must work with 
scholars to join the conversation in order to better understand the hiring decisions that 
may seem irrational, but may, in fact, be wise in certain situations (e.g. hiring external 
employees and paying them more), as in the case for my theoretical story about creative 
environments. In general, my research helps in understanding how to strategically 
manage employee modes in order to build successful talent pipelines by learning about 
the contingent factors that influence the behaviors and outcomes of newly hired middle 
managers as well as their subordinates. I address these questions by using three years of 




3.2. LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
When interpreting the results of this study, I noted several limitations that should 
be considered. First, I tested the hypotheses with data from a single company, which 
limits the generalizability of the findings. To the extent that the factors influencing the 
hiring origin in this study are idiosyncratic to the firm’s industry or the particular 
organization sampled, the results presented here may not generalize to other settings. To 
some extent this concern was mitigated by sampling differing locations, departments, and 
job functions. However, future research should explore how the results from this single 
organization generalize elsewhere. Second, I assumed that all the jobs in the department 
sampled and labeled “creative function” involve creativity as a performance criterion. In 
the future, one can break down this proxy by examining the job titles within the function, 
extract the job description for each title, and utilize a word-recognition software to mark 
when creativity and innovation-related words are mentioned in the description. This 
strategy can also be applied to the other departments that were labeled as “other 
functions” where some jobs might have creativity as a performance criterion. The jobs 
could further be ranked in a scale from high to low creativity, rather than a dichotomous 
variable.  
Third, while I controlled for human capital, it would be interesting to explore the 
interactions between the human capital of managers and their subordinates. Borrowing 
from the human capital literature, researchers might explore an ideal combination 
between the hiring origin of managers and that of subordinates —for example, predicting 
whether diversity in the hiring origin of managers and his/her subordinates (e.g. an 
internally promoted manager and an externally hired employee) would help inform the 
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complementary assets that the firm could build through their hiring decisions. 
Fourth, I made some assumptions that could be investigated further. First, I 
assumed that the firms had a choice between employing external or internal hires; in 
other words, they were not employing external hires to fill a need that could not be found 
in the firm. I also assumed, using statistical evidence from previous studies, that external 
hires are assigned to a position in the hiring firm that is equivalent to their position and 
job level in the previous firm (horizontal hiring). A study with data with employees’ job 
history would produce more robust findings when asserting whether the new hires were 
employed from the same job level or promoted in the new firm. Additionally, it would 
make a difference whether internally promoted employees were promoted to manage the 





There is practical complexity in organizational settings when studying the benefits 
of externally hired versus internally promoted middle managers. My theory highlights the 
complex nature of hiring decisions by integrating psychology and economic rationale, as 
well as the creativity and innovation literatures, to propose key contingencies that help 
answer the question: When should firms hire external middle managers versus promote 
internal middle managers to achieve beneficial outcomes? I suggest that in creative 
environments, firms are better off hiring external managers because of the time-lag nature 
of the requirement and outputs in that environment. I also theorized in a relevant yet 
understudied avenue related to the social influence of HR decisions, specifically the hired 
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